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Abstract It is widely assumed that causation is transitive, but putative counterexam-
ples abound. These examples come in three varieties: switching cases, short circuit
cases, and what I will call mismatch cases. In this paper I focus on the mismatch vari-
ety, which is widely taken to be the easiest to resolve. I will first introduce the cases
and the existing strategy for dealing with them, then present a new counterexample
which is immune to that strategy. In response to this new counterexample I will intro-
duce a novel solution, one drawing on Yablo’s proportionality principle for causation.
There is a catch, however. Either proportionality is a strong constraint—it constrains
which causal claims are true—and the solution works, or it is not and causation is not
transitive after all. I will argue that the first horn has unacceptable consequences and
should be rejected, but that the second horn may be less costly than it initially appears.
Keywords Transitivity · Proportion · Causation · Counterfactual · Counterpart ·
Chaining
That causation is, necessarily, a transitive relation on events seems to many a
bedrock datum, one of the few indisputable a priori insights that we have into
the workings of the concept. (Hall 2000, p. 198)
Is the relation of causation transitive? If c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e does it
follow of necessity that c is a cause of e? To many, the transitivity of causation seems
fundamental and yet in recent years several apparent counterexamples, which purport
to show failures of transitivity in fairly ordinary cases, have appeared. These putative
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counterexamples come in three distinct varieties: switching cases, short circuit cases,
and what I will call mismatch cases. In this paper I will introduce a new problem for
the existing responses to mismatch cases, before going on to propose a novel solution.
I will conclude that causation is not transitive, but, to address the mismatch cases at
least, we do not need it to be.
1 The transitivity thesis
The transitivity thesis can be stated as follows:
transitivity: If c is a cause of d and d is a cause of e, then c is a cause of e.
According to this thesis when I cause the phone to ring and when that ringing wakes
someone up, then it is true that I cause that person to wake up. Since such causal
chains are entirely commonplace it is no wonder that causation is widely assumed to
be transitive.
However, several putative counterexamples to transitivityhave emerged in recent
years. These examples have three distinct structures. One sort are known as switching
cases, where some initial c causes d1 rather than d2 to occur, and where d1 causes e,
but where the conclusion that c is a cause of e is unpalatable. Here is an example:
Switch:
A train is proceeding down the main track and a switch is flipped, directing the
train temporarily onto a side track. The tracks later converge and the train arrives
at the station on schedule, just as it would have had it remained on the main track
the whole time.
Here we have a chain of causation from the flipping of the switch c to the train’s
travelling on the side track d1, and from the journey on the side track d1 to the timely
arrival at the station e. However, it is specified that either track (d1 or d2) would have
taken to the station on time (e), so all c does is switch how e came to pass, not whether
it did. This leads many to think that c should not be considered a cause of e, which
contradicts transitivity.
Another sort, are so-called short circuit cases, in which a threat is created, then
cancelled by the same original cause (c) such that the eventual effect, e, happens just
as it would if c hadn’t occurred. Here is an example:
Short Circuit:
A bomb is placed under the bench where Suzy is sitting. Suzy spots it and calls
the bomb-squad who defuse the bomb. Suzy gets a clean bill of health the next
day.1
Here we have c (placing the bomb) causing some intermediate d (defusing) which
cancels the threat c posed. It is also the case that the defusing of the bomb (d) caused
1 This example is widely attributed to an unpublished work by Hartry Field.
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Suzy’s subsequent health (e). Thus, by transitivity the placing of the bomb caused
Suzy’s good health, which seems like the wrong result.
In both switching and short-circuit cases, there is no question that there is a causal
chain running from c to e, and yet it is widely taken as false that c causes e. I think
that there is much to be said about these cases and their status as counterexamples but,
whilst I will return to discuss them briefly towards the end, they are simply not the
topic of this paper and will be set aside.
Instead I will focus on a third, seemingly simpler, sort of case which I will name
mismatch cases. These are cases in which c causes d and where d causes e, but where
it is clear that the difference c made to d is irrelevant to d’s contribution to e. Here is
an example:
Purple Flame:
Jones puts some potassium salts into a hot fire. Because potassium compounds
produce a purple flamewhen heated, the flame changes to a purple colour, though
everything else remains the same. The purple flame ignites some flammable
material nearby. Here we judge that putting the potassium salts in the fire caused
the purple flame, which in turn caused the flammable material to ignite. But it
seems implausible to judge that putting the potassium salts in the fire caused the
flammable material to ignite. (Menzies 2014)2
In this example it seems that we have a case of c being a cause of d, and d being a cause
of e, but intuition dictates that c is not a cause of e: the salts did not cause the flammable
material (curtains, say) to ignite. If our intuition about the salts and the curtains is to be
trusted then this case also stands as a counterexample to transitivity. Only one coun-
terexample is required to refute the thesis, sowhatever the verdict in the cases of switch-
ing and short-circuits, if this is a genuine counterexample, then transitivity is false.
The available responses to this example are: (i) accept that causation is not transitive
and survey the damage; (ii) insist that causation is transitive and bite the bullet by
accepting the counter-intuitive conclusion that the salts caused the curtains to ignite;
(iii) show that there is a problem with the example.
In this paper I will discuss two approaches to (iii). First I will give lay out some
background issues concerning the causal relata, then I will argue, as others have,
that there is an implicit shift in the middle event (d) which nullifies the Purple Flame
example. However, I will further argue that we can create new, harder, examples which
are not open to the same response. In Sect. 3 I will turn to providing an alternative
approach. Iwill first introduceYablo’s proportionality constraint, whichwould rule out
Purple Flame and its more difficult successors as genuine counterexamples. In Sect. 4 I
will consider someproblems for this alternative approach, and offer a novel refinement.
1.1 Background: the causal relata
To aid this discussion I will apply a simple counterfactual test for causation. A full-
blown counterfactual analysis of causation would be highly controversial to assume in
2 This example is originally due to Ehring (1987, p. 323).
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such a discussion and so here I commit only to the following far weaker, andmuch less
controversial, causal test: counterfactual dependence between distinct events is prima
facie evidence of a causal connection, and the lack of such dependence is prima facie
evidence of a lack of causal connection. For simplicity I will be adopting a broadly
Lewisian reading of the relevant counterfactuals: e counterfactually depends upon c
iff, in all of the closest possible worlds where c does not occur (¬c), e does not occur
(¬e).3 So, to use a familiar example, it is true on this test that Socrates’s drinking
hemlock caused him to die because if he had not drunk the hemlock (¬c) then he
would not have died (¬e). Importantly for Lewis, when we consider what it is for an
event not to occur, we cannot simply consider a barely different version of the event
(a sip less hemlock, say), but rather a clean excision of the event, ‘leaving behind no
fragment or approximation of itself’ (Lewis 2004, p. 190).4
I will also be taking a particular stand on how we should think of the causal relata.
The above counterexample to transitivity only has bite if the effect in the first step and
the cause in the second are one and the same. If we distinguish the effect of Jones’
adding the salts (p), from the purple flame which causes the ignition ( f ), then we have
two causal steps: c causes p and f causes e. However, these two steps have no common
middle term that would, when adopting transitivity, licence the absurd conclusion
that c caused e. So, if we are taking the putative counterexamples seriously, we must
account for the sameness of the middle event in each case.
Since I will be taking the examples seriously, I will be assuming that the event
relevant to the effect in the first causal step is the same event as the event which is
relevant to the cause in the second. There are at least three alternative treatments of the
causal relata that can accommodate this assumption. We could, like Schaffer (2005),
be contrastivists about causation and think that the burning of the purple flame and
the burning of the flame indeed pick out the same event, but that each description
prompts us to consider different alternative events that might have taken place instead.
Schaffer’s approach requires thinking of causation as a four-place, rather than two-
place, relation. Alternatively, we could follow Paul (2000), and treat the relata of
causation as event aspects. On this view the effect in the first step and the cause in
the second concern the same event, but just two different aspects of that event. Or
we could instead adopt a counterpart-theoretic approach to events: take events to be
regions of a given world, but allow that they ‘occur’ in other worlds in virtue of
having counterparts in those worlds. Importantly, which regions of other worlds are
counterparts is a contextually sensitivematter: it varies with context andwith themode
of representation of the events in question.5 So, on this view ‘the burning of the purple
flame’, and ‘the burning of the flame’, both pick out the same region, and so the same
3 Here I use the simplifying device of ‘closest’ worlds, which implies that there is some closest world(s).
Lewis felt that this Limit Assumption was unmotivated (Lewis 2001, pp. 19–21) and I am inclined to agree,
but it simplifies the definition of counterfactual dependence here and is harmless for the purposes of this
paper.
4 See also Lewis (1986, pp. 210–211).
5 For Lewis’s original statement of counterpart theory see his (1968). Lewis’s account varied importantly
across several iterations as shown in Beebee and MacBride (2014). My contextualist and anti-essentialist
application of counterpart theory most closely resembles that found in Lewis (2003).
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event, but the different descriptions nevertheless imply different conditions for the
occurrence or non-occurrence of that event in other worlds.
All three such approaches have the key features I require: each considers the causal
relata to be more fine-grained than events; thus each can account for the sameness
of the middle place that is required if we are to take the putative counterexamples
seriously—there is a common middle event—without conceding that there is thereby
a common causal relatum; and each approach is sensitive to the context and the mode
of representation of the event when determining which causal relata are being picked
out. I expect any account with these features will suffice for making the case that I do
here, and nothing is intended to hang on which is adopted.
That said, the contrastive approach is revisionary in a way that will be unnecessary
here: it posits a four-place relation where a two-place relation is what common sense
would have us expect. Also, whilst I suspect that there is little of substance to choose
between the aspects and counterpart-theoretic approaches, and whilst both fit neatly
within a counterfactual treatment of causation, the counterpart-theoretic approach will
give me a more flexible notation (which I will put to use in Sect. 3).6
To illustrate, let us take it as given that drinking hemlock (c) caused Socrates to
die (e). According to the counterfactual test for causation introduced above, drinking
hemlock caused Socrates to die: it true that had Socrates not drunk the hemlock (¬c),
he would not have died (¬e). However the pedant might point out that Socrates must
die eventually, and so there is no case where ¬e is true. Of course the pedant is trading
here on the implicit cross-world identity conditions for the death event e. By the
pedant’s standard, any death of Socrates will do, but by our ordinary standard only
a relevantly similar death will be considered a case of e occurring. We capture this
in counterpart-theoretic notation as follows: refer to events by lower-case letters (c,
e etc.) and the set of counterparts related with those events by subscripts (m, n etc.).
Thus, the pedant is associating set of counterpartsm with e, so they are asking whether
drinking hemlock caused em ; the ordinary speaker on the other hand is associating
e with a different, more restricted, set of counterparts n, and thus are asking about
whether drinking hemlock caused en . This notation makes clear the implicit shift that
the pedant was trading on: drinking hemlock caused Socrates to die roughly as he did
(en), but it didn’t cause him to be mortal (em).
1.2 Counterpart-sensitive transitivity thesis
The lesson from the Socrates example is this: specifying the event alone is not sufficient
to fix the truth of a causal claim, we must also specify the set of counterparts that is
to be applied in that context. This suggests that our initial transitivity thesis was
underspecified. Here I refine the thesis to incorporate counterpart-sensitivity.7
transitivity- c: If cm is a cause of dp and dp is a cause of en , then cm is a cause
of en .
6 For a fuller exposition of the counterpart-theoretic approach to events, see McDonnell (2016).
7 Again, it is important to emphasise that the counterpart-theoretic approach is just one way (alongside the
contrastive and aspects approaches) to bring out this important, implicit, variable. I do not intend anything
of substance to hinge on adopting it in this discussion.
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This refined transitivity thesis requires that the middle event of the causal chain be
associated with the same set of counterparts when it is the effect event in the first step
and when it is the cause event in the second. This is a stricter test than the original
version, which left the cross-world identity conditions implicit, and thus open to ambi-
guity. In the next section, I will discuss the putative counterexamples to the transitivity
of causation and show how we can address these examples using this stricter version
of the thesis.
2 Putative counterexamples
I now turn to consider how this refined transitivity thesis fares when faced with certain
well-known counterexamples to the traditional transitivity thesis. I will then introduce
a novel counterexample which shows that a new strategy is required. I will introduce
just such a new strategy in Sect. 3.
Considering Purple Flame: in all of the closest worlds where the potassium salts
are not added there remains a flame, just not a purple one. So, ‘if there had been no
salts then there would have been no flame’ is false, but ‘if there had been no salts there
would have been no purple in the flame’ is true. So, the potassium salts caused there
to be purple in the flame, but not for there to have been a flame simpliciter.
The removal of the flame would avert the ignition, but simply altering the colour
of the flame would not. So, ‘if there had been no flame, there would have been no
ignition’ is true, whereas ‘if there had been no purple in the flame, there would have
been no ignition’ is false.
Conjoining the two true causal claims you get: the salts caused the purple in the
flame but the flame simpliciter caused the ignition. There is one middle event but it is
being associated with two different sets of counterparts: in the first counterfactual the
event is represented as essentially purple whereas in the second it is represented as
essentially a flame, and only accidentally a purple one. So, this case does not have the
format cm caused dp and dp caused en , but rather cm caused dp and d f caused en . If
we remained insensitive to shifts in which counterparts are associated with the events,
as the original transitivity thesis does, then this would count as a case of transitivity.
However, since the set of counterparts associated with the middle event shifts between
the first claim and the second, and since we are adopting the counterpart-sensitive
version of the transitivity thesis, this chain is not a candidate for transitivity and so
cannot act as a counterexample to the refined transitivity thesis.
Here is another putative counterexample to transitivity- c, that shares the mis-
match structure:
Dog Bite:
Terrorist, who is right-handed, must push a detonator button at noon to set off
a bomb. Shortly before noon, he is bitten by a dog on his right hand. Unable to
use his right hand, he pushes the detonator with his left hand at noon. The bomb
duly explodes. (Hitchcock 2001, p. 277)8
8 This example is attributable to McDermott (1995).
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In this case we assume that if the dog bite had not occurred, the button would still have
been pressed, just not with the left hand. So, ‘if there had been no dog bite then there
would have been no press’ is false, but ‘if there had been no dog bite there would have
been no left-handed press’ is true. Thus the dog bite is a cause of the left-handed press
but not a cause of the press simpliciter.
If there had been no press, the bomb would not have exploded, so it is true that ‘the
press caused the explosion’. We also know that ‘if there had been no left-handed press,
then there would have been no explosion’ is false, given the set-up of the case. On the
assumption that these counterfactuals reveal the causal story, the press simpliciter is a
cause of the explosion but the left-handed press is not.
Conjoining the two true causal claims you get: the dog bite caused the left-handed
press, and the press simpliciter caused the explosion. There is onemiddle event but it is
being associated with two different sets of counterparts: in the first conjunct the event
is represented as essentially left-handed, but only accidentally a pressing whereas in
the second it is represented as essentially a pressing and as only accidentally left-
handed. So, this case does not have the format cm caused dp and dp caused en , but
rather cm caused dp and d f caused en . If we remained insensitive to shifts in which
counterparts are associated with the events, as the original transitivity thesis does,
then this would count as a case of transitivity. However, since the set of counterparts
associated with the middle place shifts between the first claim and the second, and
since we are adopting the counterpart-sensitive version of the transitivity thesis, this
chain is not a candidate for transitivity and so cannot act as a counterexample to the
revised transitivity thesis.
So, we can freely admit that the Purple Flame and Dog Bite examples do yield
absurd results, but the foregoing discussion demonstrates that they do not qualify
as examples of transitivity. Not, at least, on the reading of the counterfactuals that
I offered. It is essential to this outcome that the set of counterparts associated with
the middle event shifts between the first and second causal claims. In Dog Bite, the
pressing event is first represented as essentially left-handed, then as only accidentally
so, and in Purple Flame the middle event must first be essentially purple, then only
accidentally so. A shift in the represented essence of an event yields a shift in the
counterparts associated with that event, and it is my contention that the solution to
the mismatch cases given above trades on a particular reading of which essence is
represented. In the next section, I will raise a new problem for that solution.
2.1 Dis-ambiguating the middle place
Discussing transitivity, Mackie (1980) points out that it is a ‘very old form of fallacy’
to offer ‘a syllogism with an ambiguous middle term’ and in recent times Paul (2000)
and Schaffer (2005) have exploited the strategy of disambiguating themiddle term just
as I have here. As discussed above, the general strategy accepts that there is a common
event involved in each step (in line with common sense), but that this alone does not
ensure that there is a common causal relatum. To determine which contrast pair, which
event aspect, or which counterpart relation applies, we must attend to the context and
the mode of representation. Thus, the general strategy is a contextualist one, and it
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diagnoses an ambiguity in the middle place that the right reading the context can help
us resolve.
In the Socrates example discussed earlier, there was just such an ambiguity in the
specification of the effect—Socrates’s death—that the pedant exploited. In that case,
we had to attend to the context to work out how the implicit variable (that determines
which counterparts were associated with the event) ought to be filled in. Once the
implicit variable is given an explicit value, there is no longer room for such pedantry:
Socrates’s drinking hemlock caused him to die in roughly that way, and roughly at that
time. When we make some information about the event’s modality part of the causal
claim, we narrow the scope for ambiguity. This helps us fix upon the causal relatum
that we are making a claim about: not any old death, but one sufficiently like the actual
one. The lesson here is that we can disambiguate the middle term in the transitivity
cases above by explicitly delimiting its essence.
I think that this feature of the contextualist strategy can be exploited to create a
new, more resilient, counter-example, however. Consider the following example:
Explicit Purple Flame:
The potassium caused the purple flame (which was essentially purple and essen-
tially a flame), and the purple flame (still essentially both purple and a flame)
caused the ignition.9
It is important to point out that counterpart theory does not rule out there being a
context in which such a rich essence for the purple flame is appropriate—without a
further commitment to fixed essences, any set of counterparts can constitute a viable
counterpart relation. Similarly, the aspect theorist cannot plausibly rule out double-
aspect causes in general. The iron needs to be hot and heavy to get the creases out,
and a bullet needs to be both travelling quickly and made of a rigid material, to pierce
the armour. In both cases two aspects of the event are required for the effect.
For ease of reference I will use dp f to represent the burning of the purple flame as
essentially both purple and a flame (or as having the double-aspect of being both purple
and a flame). If the potassium salts had not been added, then the flame would have
been orange and so the flame would not have had both of the essential features/aspects
specified in Explicit Purple Flame. Thus the potassium salts (cm) caused the purple
flame (dp f ) on this reading. Similarly, if the purple flame been cleanly excised (¬dp f ),
then there would have been no ignition (¬em), so the purple flame caused the ignition
on this reading too.10
I think that the new case does formally qualify as an example of transitivity because
cm caused dp f and dp f caused en . So, as long as the conclusion that the potassium
caused the ignition is absurd, this qualifies as a counterexample to transitivity- c.
(I omit the equivalent explicit formulation for Dog Bite for brevity.)
9 Note, I use “essentially” here as a shorthand for whatever feature or features that every counterpart has.
Since the set of counterparts associated with an event can vary across contexts, so too can an event’s essence.
10 Here it is important to recall that the cause event is to be cleanly excised and not just replaced by a close
alternative, as discussed in Sect. 1.1 above. In the case of the event which is both essentially purple, and
essentially a flame, we are to consider the closest worlds where whatever occupies the relevant region is
neither purple nor a flame.
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It is worth offering some defence of this example, however, as it is crucial to
what follows. This case leaves the mechanics of the original Menzies example intact:
nothing about the physical region is changed by the specification of the essence, and
so nothing about the causal structure should be thought to have changed. All that has
been changed is the essence imputed to the event in the middle place. The problem
in the original cases of Purple Flame and Dog Bark was that the initial cause was
irrelevant to the eventual effect, and that remains true in the new example. What
contextualist approaches try to do is distinguish the modality of the middle event (d)
in the first clause, with the same event in the second. On a friendly reading of the
context, this approach does the job: there are two candidate readings of the middle
event in each example which, once disambiguated, highlight a plausible equivocation.
Explicit Purple Flame is designed to shine a light on the work being done by the
friendly reading of the context that is required for this solution. By showing that an
unfriendly context, in this case one in which the event modality is stipulated, yields
an unpalatable answer, the contextualist must say what is wrong with the unfriendly
reading, or accept that they have not yet solved the original problem. Such a context
may be contrived, or unnatural but it is a possible context nevertheless.
What seems to be goingwrong in all three cases, and perhapsmost clearly inExplicit
Purple Flame, is that there is irrelevant detail in the middle place. A simple counter-
factual test does not have the resources to defend against such irrelevancy, however:
the truth of the relevant counterfactual only establishes that the non-occurrence of one
event (c) is sufficient for the non-occurrence of the other (e), not that every part of c is
relevant to the occurrence of e. For example, if Suzy’s throw is a cause of the window
breaking on the counterfactual account, it may well be the case that some broader
event including Suzy’s throw and some irrelevant additional region, or aspects, counts
as a cause too. So, if irrelevancy is the issue, then we need an amendment to the coun-
terfactual approach that delivers relevance. It is to just such a proposed amendment
that I now turn.
3 A proportionality constraint
In the last section I showed that a promising solution to themismatch counterexamples
to transitivity- c runs aground when faced with a new, more difficult, sort of case.
Whilst such cases are viable as counterexamples, it is clear that they trade on the
irrelevancy that a simple counterfactual account allows. In this section I consider a
new strategy and key to this strategy is the notion of proportionality. In the next section
I will critically assess this approach, and offer a modified alternative.
Suppose that Derek has a triangle that is scarlet and that he places it in front of
Sophie, a pigeon that is trained to peck at all and only red things. Sophie then pecks
the triangle. What caused Sophie to peck? Consider this causal scenario under two
different descriptions:
1. The placing of the red triangle caused Sophie to peck.
2. The placing of the scarlet triangle caused Sophie to peck.
In the first description it seems as though the redness of the triangle is essential and so in
any close world in which the placing of the red triangle does not occur, Sophie will not
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peck. Thus the simple counterfactual test I have adopted counts the placing of the red
triangle as a cause of Sophie’s peck and this seems like the right, intuition-matching,
result.
Compare this with the second descriptionwhich represents the scarletness as essen-
tial. In the closest worlds in which the event of placing the scarlet patch is cleanly
excised, Sophie will not peck. Hence, the simple counterfactual analysis would count
the two causal claims above on a par: both are causes.
The difference between scarlet and red in this sort of case was discussed by Yablo
(1992). Yablo argues that the relationship of scarlet to red is that of determinate to
determinable where the determinate, P, determines the determinable Q only if: (i)
necessarily, for all x , if x has P then x has Q; and (ii) possibly, for some x , x has Q
but lacks P (1992, p. 252). Roughly, if something is scarlet, it must be red, but if it is
red it need not be scarlet. This can be translated into counterpart-theoretic terms: if
something is essentially scarlet, then all of its counterparts will also be red, but if it is
essentially red then it may well have non-scarlet counterparts.
In the case of Sophie, Yablo points out that citing the determinate scarlet, when
citing the determinable red will do, amounts to giving too much information. It need
not have been that precise shade to make Sophie peck, so to be that precise about
the shade is to be, if not strictly wrong, at least misleading about what was required
to make Sophie peck. I may be left thinking, wrongly in this case, that my crimson
triangle won’t elicit a peck too.
Too little information can be just as bad. Suppose that a second pigeon Alice had
been trained to peck all and only scarlet things. Does placing the red triangle cause
Alice to peck? If it had not been red, then Alice would not have pecked, so the claim
looks true by the lights of the counterfactual test, but intuitively it is much better to
cite the scarlet colour of the triangle in explaining Alice’s peck. Being too imprecise
in respect of the colour of the triangle may mislead: I may be left thinking, wrongly
in this case, that my crimson triangle will elicit a peck too.
In the Sophie case, the scarlet was sufficient for the peck, but not required for it—it
is not required because any other red would do. In the Alice case the triangle being
scarlet is required, but just being red is not sufficient. So, here is a proposal: for a
causal claim to be properly formed the cause must be both sufficient and required for
the effect. This is the essence of Yablo’s proportionality constraint: the cause must be
specific enough, but not too specific, with respect to the effect.
More formally, Yablo offers the following definitions:
Proportionality:
Where X is a fine-grained event defined in terms of some property and where +
and − indicate, respectively, more or less specificity or determinateness of the
property in question.
sufficient: X− is sufficient for effect E iff for every X+, if X−, had occurred
without X+, E would still have occurred.
required: An event X+, is required for E iff for every X−, if X− had occurred
without X+, E would not have occurred.
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Yablo’s formulation adopts a fine-grained event ontology. As discussed earlier, this
fine-graining of events fails to capture the sense in which the purple flame and the
flame, the left-handed press and the press, are the same events being described in two
different ways. The contrastive, event aspect and counterpart-theoretic accounts of
the causal relata were all able to capture the idea that there could be single (coarse-
grained) event, but potentially many (fine-grained) causal relata. So, before going on
to apply the proportionality principle to the issues concerning transitivity, we must
first translate it into one of these alternative conceptions of events, and of the causal
relata. Here is where I think the notation we find in the counterpart-theoretic approach
is especially helpful (though, again, I do not claim that it is essential).
We can translate the proportionality principle into counterpart theoretic terms by
introducing the notion of an event being strictlymore fragile or robust when associated
with one set of counterparts rather than another. An event e, associated with set of
counterpartsm, is strictly more fragile than the same event e when associated with set
of counterparts n iff every counterpart of em is a counterpart of en and not vice versa.
Robustness is just the invert of fragility so en is strictly more robust than em iff em is
strictly more fragile than en .
To represent the relative robustness of two sets of counterparts associated with the
same event in different contexts, it will help to represent one relation in terms of the
other. So, suppose that an event e can be taken to be relatively robust in context D. I
will refer to its set of counterparts in D as n in that context and write en when referring
to e under counterpart relation n. In some other context C in which e is taken to be
strictly more fragile than it is associated with set of counterparts n, I will refer to that
counterpart relation as cn+. In some other context E in which e is taken to be strictly
less fragile (i.e. more robust) than when it is associated with set of counterparts n,
I will refer it as cn−. This is simply a naming device, like Yablo’s X+ and X− (for
more and less specific), that helps express the idea that these two counterpart relations
have a particular logical relation. On Yablo’s account scarlet is a determinate of the
determinable red. On my account, the placing the scarlet triangle in front of Sophie is
strictly more fragile than the placing of a red triangle in front of Sophie. The subject
of the proportionality constraint has moved from properties on Yablo’s view, to event-
counterpart pairs on mine.11
I think this allows the following analogue of the proportionality constraint, utilising
event-counterpart pairs in place of Yablo’s properties12:
Proportionalitycp
sufficientcp: An event c, associated with set of counterparts m—cm—is
sufficientcp for effect e iff for every cm+, if cm had occurred without cm+, e
would still have occurred.
11 It may prove to be an advantage of the counterpart-theoretic approach that it is not restricted to natural
properties. If one counterpart relation entails another, but not vice versa, then the first is strictly more fragile
than the second regardless of how unnatural or gruesome it is.
12 I am using Weslake’s (2013) paraphrase, and I alter the notation from Yablo’s X+ for more specific and
X− for less specific to my preferred reference to the robustness or fragility of the event when associated
with different sets of counterparts.
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requiredcp: An event c, associated with set of counterparts m—cm—is
requiredcp for e iff for every cm−, if cm−, had occurred without cm , e would
not have occurred.
This way, the placing the red triangle is sufficientcp for Sophie’s pecking since had
it been crimson, and therefore not scarlet (cm+) but still red (cm), the triangle would
still have made her peck. The redness of the triangle is also requiredcp for the pecking
since if the triangle had been coloured cm−, but not red cm , the pecking would not
have occurred.
The same event, taken as essentially scarlet (i.e. associated with set of counterparts
n, and noted as cn), is also sufficientcp for the pecking since had the triangle been a
lighter or darker shade of scarlet (cn+), Sophie still would have pecked. However the
essentially scarlet event (cn) is not requiredcp for the pecking since had the triangle
still been red (cn−), but a different shade (¬cn) then the pecking would still have
occurred.
On this account, the event of placing the triangle is the proportional cause of the
pecking when it is the placing of an essentially red triangle, but not when it is the
placing of an essentially scarlet triangle. Yablo’s suggestion that proportionality is a
constraint on a well-formed causal claim would appear to explain the initial, intuitive,
reading of the Sophie case: it is preferable to cite the red triangle rather than the scarlet
when giving the cause of the peck.
Returning now to the mismatch counterexamples from Sect. 2, it seems that the
proportionality constraint lends weight to the interpretation of the events I originally
offered. In the first version of the Purple Flame case I took the flame to be essentially
purple when it was an effect of the salts and accidentally purple when it was the cause
of the blaze. Since the flame simpliciter is sufficientcp and requiredcp for the blaze, but
the purple flame is merely sufficientcp, the proportionality constraint warrants taking
the flame simpliciter to be the cause of the ignition, and the purple flame not to be.
Since the salts did not cause there to be a flame simpliciter, there is no causal chaining
in this case and no counterexample to the transitivity thesis. Only by building toomuch
information into the specification of the middle event did the apparent problem arise.
In the Dog Bite case, the left-handed press is merely sufficientcp, for the detonation:
since any old press will do, the left-handed press is not requiredcp. Specifying that it
was a left-handed press provides toomuch information and violates the proportionality
constraint. So, the bite caused a left-handed press, but a press simpliciter caused the
explosion. Since the modality of the left-handed press and the press simpliciter can
be distinguished on a counterpart theory of events, there is no causal chain that runs
from the bite to the detonation. Once again, the proportionality constraint provides
justification for treating the middle place in this putative case of transitivity as having
shifted between the first causal step and the second. Where there is no overlapping
chain, there is no counterexample to the transitivity thesis.
So, adopting a proportionality criterion lends further support to the contextualist
argument that Purple Flame and Dog Bite were not genuine counterexamples because,
in my preferred way of speaking, they traded on a conflation with regards to which set
of counterparts is associated with the middle event in the chain. However, I offered a
harder problem in the case of Explicit Purple Flame. In that harder case the conflation
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is removed by explicitly fixing the set of counterparts which is associated with the
event in the middle place so as to ensure a qualifying transitive structure. The harder
case was made possible by the need for an interpretive step to establish what set
of counterparts should be attributed to the middle event (or which aspect was under
consideration) in a given context. The harder case works by overriding the interpretive
step:
Explicit Purple Flame:
The potassium caused the purple flame (which was essentially purple and essen-
tially a flame), and the purple flame (still essentially both purple and a flame)
caused the ignition.
In this case there is no room to re-interpret the essences (or aspects) that apply to the
middle event because they have been made explicit and, by a counterfactual test, the
salts cause the purple flame and the purple flame causes the fire. So, by transitivity-
c the salts were a cause of the ignition. Unlike the original Purple Flame and Dog Bite
cases, this case qualifies as transitive and has an absurd conclusion. It looks like a
genuine counterexample.
However, notice how Explicit Purple Flame falls foul of Proportionalitycp: the salts
are requiredcp and sufficientcp for the purple flame but the purple flame is merely
sufficientcp, not requiredcp, for the ignition since any colour of flame would have
done the job of igniting the curtains. The first step is proportional but the second
step is not. Once we replace the second step with the proportional claim that the flame
simpliciter caused the curtains to ignite, the case is no longer a candidate for transitivity
as, once again, the middle place shifts between the first causal claim (where it is
essentially purple and essentially a flame) and the second (where it is only accidentally
purple). There is no stable position in which the claims are proportional and where
transitivity- c would make the salts a cause of the ignition.
So, each mismatch counterexample to transitivity- c, when genuinely transi-
tive, fails to meet my revised Proportionalitycp constraint. This motivates my central
hypothesis in this paper: that chains of causation do not always confer an overall causal
connection between the first event and the last, but chains where each step satisfies
Proportionalitycp (i.e. proportional causal claims) might. In the remaining section,
I will consider a dilemma that is raised by this hypothesis.
4 The dilemma of proportionality
On introducingYablo’s proportionality constraint I framed it as a constraint on a ‘prop-
erly formed’ causal claim. This was intentionally ambiguous between two readings.
On the first, strong, reading it is a constraint on which causal claims can be true. On
this reading, an out-of-proportion causal claim is literally false (though it may remain
acceptable to say for pragmatic reasons). On the second, weak, reading, the propor-
tionality constraint is not a constraint on which claims are true, but merely a constraint
on which causal claims are optimally formed in some sense. On this reading, an out-
of-proportion causal claim can be true. I think that those in favour of a proportionality
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constraint face something of a dilemma on this point. In this section I will lay out the
dilemma, and then give an argument against the strong interpretation of the propor-
tionality constraint. I will then consider what work a weak proportionality constraint
can still do in relation to the transitivity of causation.
On the one hand, it seems as though proportionality must be a strong constraint if
it is to do the work I have put it to in the forgoing discussion of transitivity. Otherwise
out-of-proportion causal claims could still be true, and it would still be true (even
if sub-optimal in some sense) to say that ‘the purple flame caused the curtains to
ignite’ in my explicit version of the example. The proportionality-based solution to
Explicit Purple Flame requires that we reject that causal claim in favour of citing the
flame (purple or otherwise) as the cause of the ignition, but if the out-of-proportion
claim remains true, then we have no basis on which to reject it. Only if the strong
interpretation of proportionality is true, and so out-of-proportion claims are false in
general, can we reasonably rule out the problem links. This would be a significant
success and there are those in the literature who do seem to take proportionality to be
such a strong constraint: Menzies and List (2010), Sartorio (2010) and Yablo (1992)
(though I believe the connection to transitivity is novel).
On the other hand, if proportionality is a constraint on which causal claims are true,
then that would rule out many of the canonical claims of causation that we ordinarily
endorse: it would be false (and not just infelicitous) to attribute Sophie’s peck to the
placing of the scarlet triangle, it would be false to say ‘the slamming door caused the
baby to wake’ or to claim that being shot by Mark David Chapman was what caused
John Lennon to die. These would be false because there is some more proportional
claim: that it was the placing of a red triangle, the making of a loud noise or being
shot by someone that did the causal work. We can perhaps grant that such ordinary
causal claims are not optimally informative of the causal structure, but surely we do
not want to consider them false. If such claims really are false, then much of our
ordinary causal talk is literally false. Imposing proportionality as a strong constraint
on causation seems like a non-starter if we are to take our ordinary claims seriously.13
So, we have a dilemma: if the proportionality constraint is a strong constraint then
we can resolve the mismatch problems of transitivity, but at the cost of rejecting much
of our ordinary talk as false, but if it is a merely a weak constraint then we can rescue
our ordinary causal talk but at the cost of our solution to those problems.
In what follows I will make the case that we should embrace the second horn of the
dilemma and that doing so is not as costly as it might appear.
4.1 Proportionality as a strong constraint
If we suppose that the proportionality constraint is indeed a strong constraint, then all
causes are proportional and so there is no such thing as an out-of-proportion cause.
That being so, the following thesis should be exactly equivalent to transitivity- c
introduced earlier:
13 Note that the examples given are clearly assertable, so they tell against even the pragmatic reading of
the proportionality constraint discussed in Shapiro and Sober (2012).
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proportional transitivity- c: If cm is a proportional cause of dp and dp is
a proportional cause of en , then cm is a proportional cause of en .
Notice that this thesis is committed to the proportionality of the first cause (cm) with
respect to the eventual effect (en) when each step is proportional. So, this thesis makes
an important prediction: in every genuine causal chain, the first cause will be propor-
tional with respect the last effect. I think a familiar type of example from the causal
literature shows such a prediction to be false: cases of early pre-emption.
In Lewis’s original (1973) presentation of his counterfactual analysis of causation,
he introduced cases of early pre-emption14 to show why he needed causation to be
the ancestral of, and not straightforwardly identical with, counterfactual dependence
between distinct events. Early pre-emption cases are those where it is intuitively obvi-
ous that one event (c1) caused the effect (e) but where there is no counterfactual
dependence of the effect upon that event because there is an unused back-up (c2)
which guaranteed that the effect would occur. Here is a classic example:
Early Pre-emption:
Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Suzy picks up the only rock and throws it
towards the window. If Suzy hadn’t thrown the rock, Billy would have (and he
is notoriously accurate). The rock strikes the window and the window breaks.
Here it is obvious that Suzy is a cause of the window’s breaking but it is equally
obvious that the breaking did not depend on Suzy because Billy was ready to step
in. More precisely, ‘if Suzy had not thrown the rock then the window would not have
broken’ is false because Billy would have broken it in any case. So, there is no overall
counterfactual dependence of the window breaking on Suzy’s throw. Does this mean
that the counterfactual analyst about causationmust deny that Suzy is a cause?No, said
Lewis. Causation is transitive but counterfactual dependence is not. So whilst there
was a failure of overall dependence of the effect upon the initial cause in this case,
there was nevertheless a chain of dependence leading from the throw to the window
breaking: the rock’s being at that point inmid-air (event d) depended on Suzy throwing
it (c1), and by the time the rock is at that point Billy has been frustrated (c2 had not
occurred), and so as of that moment the window’s breaking (e) depends upon the rock
being at that point (d). Therefore, e depends on d, and d depends on c1. There may
be no overall dependence of e upon c1 but there is a step-wise chain of dependence
from c1 to e via d and so, by the transitivity of causation, c1 is a cause of e. Thus, by
appeal to some version of the transitivity thesis, the counterfactual theorist need not
worry about cases of early pre-emption.
However, this neat response does not work if the version of the transitivity thesis
appealed to is proportional transitivity- c. Notice that Suzy’s throwing the rock
as she did was proportional to its being at that point in mid air. Simply specifying
14 Cases of late, super and trumping varieties of pre-emption came later—see Lewis (1986), Hall (2000)
and Schaffer (2000) for discussion. Whilst important cases, they differ in structure from early pre-emption
because they are each immune to the transitivity-based response Lewis gives in the original case. Thus, they
are not relevant to my discussion here. However, see Bernstein (2014) and McDonnell (2016) for critical
discussion of these cases.
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‘a child’s throwing the rock’ would be too general, it would imply (wrongly, we can
suppose) that Billy’s throw would have passed through the same point. However, had
Suzy not thrown the rock, and Billy had, the window would have still broken. So
Suzy’s throw is not a proportional cause of the breaking, a child’s throw is. What
this means is that whilst the proportional causal chain runs from Suzy’s throw to the
window breaking, it does not result in a proportional dependence of the window’s
breaking on Suzy’s throw. This contradicts proportional transitivity- c. A chain
of proportional causation does not necessarily yield proportionality overall.
It is important to note that this line of argument is not based on producing a counter-
intuitive result, in the manner of Purple Flame and Dog Bark from earlier. Rather, this
argument shows that the proportional transitivity- c thesis, which is a direct
consequence of combining the transitivity of causation with a strong proportionality
constraint, is false. The thesis makes a prediction about there being overall propor-
tionality between the first and last steps in a causal chain and that prediction fails in
cases with an early pre-emption structure. Thus the thesis is not generally true.
The foregoing should make us question the strategy of combining a transitivity
thesis and a strong proportionality constraint on causation. However, the same Early
Pre-emption example gives us reason to question the strong constraint directly. Suzy’s
throwing the rock is not a proportional cause of thewindowbreaking, a child’s throw is.
So, if adopting the proportionality constraint requires that we reject out-of-proportion
causes, then it requires that we deny that Suzy’s throwing the rock caused the window
to break. Such a result would be at odds with a decades-old consensus in the causal
literature: the pre-emptor is the cause. I think this gives us sufficient reason to reject
the strong interpretation of the proportionality constraint and with it the first horn of
the dilemma.
4.2 Proportionality as a weak constraint
Recall that the problemwith the initial transitivity- c thesiswas that it did not restrict
its predictions of causal chaining to only proportional causal links. As we have just
seen, the problem with proportional transitivity- c (which was a consequence
of the strong interpretation) is that it wrongly predicts overall proportionality when
all the links are proportional. This leaves room for a third alternative:
proportional chaining: If cm is a proportional cause of dp and dp is a
proportional cause of en , then cm is a cause of en .
The important shift here is that whilst the links in the causal chain must be pro-
portional, the overall causal connection from the first event to the last need not. So,
proportional chaining does not make the same problematic prediction that pro-
portional transitivity- c made in the early pre-emption case, but it still rules out
the problematic cases of Purple Flame, Dog Bite and Explicit Purple Flame that were
counterexamples to the initial transitivity- c (since each have out-of-proportion
steps, proportional chaining is not committed to the problematic conclusions).
This thesis gives us the causal chaining that we want, without the problematic conclu-
sions that we don’t in those cases.
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There are two important things to note about proportional chaining. First, since
this thesis distinguishes causes fromproportional causes, it had better be read in light of
a weak, rather than strong, interpretation of the proportionality constraint. Otherwise,
the final clause in proportional chaining is exactly equivalent to the final clause
in proportional transitivity- c, collapsing the all-important distinction between
the two theses. Second, proportional chaining is not a transitivity thesis: the
relation referred to in the consequent is one about causation, and the relations in the
antecedent concern proportional causation. In otherwords, one candeny the transitivity
of causation and still embrace proportional chaining.
A question remains, however, about exactly what the proportionality constraint is
constraining on this weaker reading. I think this is an interesting question, perhaps
an urgent one if my foregoing reasoning is correct, and whilst I have not yet settled
on a satisfying answer, I think a recent proposal sketched by Weslake points in the
right direction. Weslake sees the role of proportionality as psychological, rather than
metaphysical, so it can explain our causal judgements but it cannot constrain the
causal truths. On such a reading we need only see the explanatory value in the more
proportional causal claims, to understandwhywemight prefer to assert them in certain
cases. This explanatory value is defeasible, however, and to be balanced with other
competing values (see Weslake 2010, 2013 for details).
I think that this proposal is promising, but as it stands it will not be able to explain
why proportional causal claims successfully form chains, and out of proportion claims
do not. My contention here has been that the mismatch cases trade on building too
much irrelevant detail into the specification of the events involved, and whilst that
irrelevant detail does not make the component causal claims any less true, the special
subclass of true causal claims that do not build in such irrelevant detail, are those
which successfully form causal chains. The proportionality constraint appears to pick
out that subclass.
Yet, even without a complete account of why proportionality licenses chaining,
I can grasp the second horn of the dilemma: I deny that causation is transitive in
light of the mismatch problems discussed above, but still embrace proportional
chaining. What we were interested in to begin with was the passing of a causal
mark along a causal chain, not transitivity per se. We can retain that important feature
without paying the price of full-blown transitivity. I think that this is progress.
4.3 Switching and short circuits
At the beginning of the paper, I set aside switching and short circuit examples to
focus on mismatch cases. What I have now said about those mismatch cases, about the
more difficult sort of case we can create, and about proportionality, will leave those
switching and short circuit cases untouched: if they were counterexamples before,
they remain so to the revised thesis I offer. That is because the mismatch cases had a
different structure all along: they traded on a mismatch in which aspect was relevant
at each step. The short-circuit and switching cases, by contrast, have more in common
with cases of causal redundancy: the switch, or the short-circuiting mechanism, are
parts of a relevant causal chain, just one that makes no difference to the eventual effect.
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I think that this difference in structure justifies a divide and conquer strategy, one
which considers the cases separately. This is what I have done here. My conclusions
about the mismatch cases leave a range of responses to the switching and short-
circuit cases open: we could accept the counter-intuitive conclusions (as Hall 2000,
pp. 205–210 argues we should in switching cases, cf. Sartorio 2005); we could develop
treatments within modelling frameworks (see Weslake forthcoming for discussion);
or we could bundle these cases together with cases of pre-emption and overdetermi-
nation as cases which reveal deep problems with dependence accounts of causation.
However we proceed in discussing those cases, the observations about the easy cre-
ation of mismatch examples and proportionality that I have discussed here will remain
important to bear in mind.
5 Conclusion
I have argued here that certain existing putative counterexamples to transitivity- c
fail to hit their mark as they equivocate on the middle place of the would-be transitive
chain. This is a familiar approach to these examples, however I have shown that we
can construct a genuine counterexample by making explicit which essence is to be
associated with the middle event.15 The new counterexample of Explicit Purple Flame
is contrived, certainly, but it is a genuine counterexample nevertheless.
The insight offered in response to this new case, and to mismatch counterexamples
more generally, is thatwhen they appear to refute the transitivity thesis, they also violate
proportionality. That is, at least one of the causal claims that constitute the chain is
not proportional in a sense which is related to Yablo’s proportionality constraint. Not
only does this show us what goes wrong with Explicit Purple Flame, it also explains
the inelegance of the example: we prefer proportional explanations. The proposal in
this paper is that we consider proportionality to be a constraint on which causal chains
entail a causal connection between the first event and the last linked by that chain.
This proposal shines a light on two alternative readings of the proportionality con-
straint and generates a dilemma: if the proportionality constraint is a strong constraint
(i.e. it constrains which claims are true) then we can resolve the mismatch problems
of transitivity, but at the cost of rejecting much of our ordinary talk as false, but if it
is merely a weak constraint (i.e. it picks out a special subclass of true claims) then
we can rescue our ordinary causal talk but at the cost of our solution to the mis-
match cases. I have argued that a strong interpretation of the role of proportionality is
untenable—it falsifies much of our ordinary causal talk and leads to false conclusions
in early pre-emption style cases—but I have also argued that the costs of endorsing a
weak interpretation are not as significant as they appear. We can retain the benefits of
chaining without incurring the costs of full-blown transitivity by adopting the pro-
portional chaining thesis. I conclude that causation is not transitive, but, pending
a satisfactory treatment of switching and short-circuit cases, we may not need it to be.
15 Here I adopted my preferred counterpart-theoretic approach to events, though I intend nothing of sub-
stance to hang on that choice in this discussion. I suspect that the entirety of my case here could be made,
albeit less neatly, using an event-aspects theory of the causal relata.
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